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of Welfare: A Forced Marriage?* 
T. M. Scanlon,  Jr. 
There  are many  points  in John  Roemer's  paper  which  I would  like to 
discuss. Since I am in general agreement  with his criticisms of bargaining 
theory as an approach  to distributive justice,  I will focus on the question 
of equality of welfare versus equality of resources and the striking theorem 
which  Roemer  states in  the  fourth  section  of  his  paper.  This  theorem 
purports  to  show  that,  insofar  as  it  claims  to  differ  from  equality  of 
welfare, the idea of equality of resources is incoherent:  there are elements 
within  this idea  itself  which  lead  inexorably  to the  conclusion  that any 
acceptable allocation mechanism  must be welfare equalizing.  In addition, 
Roemer  suggests  that his axioms  render  "the distinction  between  pref- 
erences  and  resources  extremely  hazy" (p.  107)  and  "force upon  us  a 
reductionst,  determinist  program" (p.  109). 
Roemer's conclusion  is not that we must advocate equality of welfare 
but,  rather,  that  adequate  principles  of  distributive justice  must  move 
beyond  "economic  environments"  and  be  sensitive  to  the  "names" of 
goods:  they  must  take into  account  which  goods  are being  distributed, 
not merely  the level of utility (preference  satisfaction) that is produced. 
I agree with this conclusion,  and I imagine  that any defender  of equality 
of  resources  would  have  agreed  from  the outset.  This  leads me  to look 
back at Roemer's  axioms  with a more  critical eye. 
In  what  follows  I will argue,  first, that  the  axioms  which  Roemer 
puts forward as a characterization of resource egalitarianism in fact include 
principles  which only a welfarist would accept. Second,  I will argue  that 
the  welfarism  which  these  axioms  require  is not as extreme  as Roemer 
suggests: they do not "force upon us a reductionist, determinist  program" 
unless  all forms  of  welfarism  do  so.  Finally, in the  concluding  sections 
of  the  paper,  I will consider  some  problems  which  Roemer's discussion 
raises for resourcism and discuss the issue of "ideal" versus "second-best" 
theory. 
* This  is a much  revised  version  of  comments  on John  Roemer's  "The  Mismarriage 
of  Bargaining  Theory  and  Distributive Justice" (in this issue),  delivered  at the  Weingart 
conference  in  March  1985.  I am  grateful  to Joshua  Cohen  and John  Rawls for  helpful 
comments  on an earlier draft. 
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AXIOMS:  RESOURCIST  OR WELFARIST? 
A natural suspicion is that Roemer's axioms somehow incorporate welfarist 
intuitions  which are not part of the idea of equality of resources but alien 
to  it.  Consider,  for  example,  axioms  D2,  Pareto  optimality,  and  D4, 
resource  monotonicity,  both  of  which  employ  a utility-based  notion  of 
Pareto  dominance.  Any  principle  of  resource  equality  requires  some 
means of comparing bundles of resources as "larger,"  "smaller,"  or "equal," 
and it would be question begging to assume at the outset that this standard 
of comparison must just be the amount of utility which a bundle produces. 
Employing  a resourcist  notion  of  "size," we could  formulate  resource- 
based analogues  to D2 and  D4.  Call these  axioms  D2r and D4r. Axiom 
D2r  says that a mechanism  must  not  choose  an allocation  a if there  is 
another,  a',  which assigns  some  person  a "larger" bundle  and no one  a 
"smaller" bundle  than that assigned  by a. Axiom  D4r says that when  the 
available  resources  increase,  no  one's  assigned  bundle  may  become 
"smaller." 
Since the "size" of a resource  bundle  will depend  on which goods  it 
contains,  that is, on what Roemer  calls the "names" of these  goods,  this 
notion  cannot  even be formulated  within the system which Roemer  pro- 
vides. It is excluded  by the domain axiom D 1, which requires mechanisms 
to be defined  on economic  environments.  Nonetheless,  D2r and D4r are 
requirements  which  any proponent  of resource  egalitarianism  ought  to 
accept.  It may  be  that  under  plausible  assumptions  about  the  idea  of 
resource  bundle  "size," and  given  the  usual  assumptions  about  utility 
functions,  D2r and D4r imply their utility-based correlates. Nonetheless, 
D2  and  D4  could -reasonably  be  thought  to  be  no  part of  the  idea  of 
equality of resources.  A resource  egalitarian may believe  that "the usual 
assumptions"  about  utility do  not  always hold  or, more  generally,  may 
reject utility as a standard  for  measuring  distributive  shares.  The  idea 
that  "if the  total  bundle  of  resources  increases,  neither  agent's  utility 
falls" (Roemer, p. 105) might be thought to express an optimistic (welfarist) 
attitude  toward the consequences  of economic  development  rather than 
a necessary  tenet  of  resource  egalitarianism. 
Consider now Roemer's axiom D5, consistency of resource allocation 
across dimensions  (CONRAD).  What is the  rationale  for including  this 
consistency  requirement  as part of a characterization  of  resource  egali- 
tarianism?  The  moral  of  the  Andrea  and  Bob  story  is  that  whenever 
there are "hidden resources" (such as endorphin  levels) which influence 
individual  utility these  must be included  as part of the resource  bundles 
which are to be equalized.  This idea has intuitive force, and I will return 
to it later. But the effect  of CONRAD  is much broader. Since CONRAD 
is formulated  in terms of economic  environments,  it is blind to matters 
of  causal dependence.  Suppose  that,  in some  environment  e  involving 
m  +  n goods,  once  n of  these  goods  have been  distributed  in a certain 
way the  utility consequences  of  possible  distributions  of  the  remaining 
m goods  are exactly the same as the utility consequences  of distributions Scanlon  Equality of Resources  and Welfarism  113 
of m goods  in some  other  (m =  good)  environment  (*. Then  CONRAD 
requires that (assuming  the original distribution  of n goods  is accepted) 
the  remaining  m goods  in  e  and  the m goods  in (*  must  be distributed 
in exactly the same way whether  or not these  are the same goods and whether 
or not the n  additional goods are in any sense present as  "hidden  resources" 
influencing individual utility levels in the smaller environment. 
Note that, given the richness of the domain of economic environments, 
for any environment  (* and mechanism  F, there will be many "extended" 
environments  e  related  to  (*  in  the  way just  described.  Not  all of  the 
extra resources  in these  extended  environments  will represent  "hidden 
resources" present in societies represented  by (*. Nonetheless,  CONRAD 
requires "consistency" between  each of these environments  and (*. Why 
should  this be required? The  most natural answer is that utility sums up 
all  relevant  reasons  for  distinguishing  between  distributions  from  the 
point  of  view  of justice;  therefore,  when  the  utility  consequences  of 
possible distributions in two situations are the same, the same distributions 
must be selected as just in each case. This rationale fits CONRAD  exactly, 
but it is clearly a welfarist intuition,  one  which a resource  egalitarian  is 
unlikely  to accept. 
Another  rationale  for  CONRAD,  perhaps  the  one  Roemer  has  in 
mind,  would  be  this: whenever  two environments  (*  and  e  are related 
in such  a way that it is possible that the  additional  goods  in  e  represent 
"hidden  resources" in a society  represented  by (*,  then  the  two should 
be treated in a way that is "consistent." (In this argument,  the expressive 
poverty  of  the  language  of economic  environments  serves as an excuse 
for what lawyers call "overbreadth.") Does this rationale provide grounds 
for  a  resource  egalitarian  to  accept  CONRAD?  It  would  do  so  if  the 
resource  egalitarian  agreed  with the  moral  of  the  story of  Andrea  and 
Bob as Roemer  describes  it, and if the resource  egalitarian accepted  the 
restrictions of the language of economic environments. These are, however, 
two fairly large "ifs." 
To sum up: because of the limited expressive  power of the language 
of economic  environments,  the "fit"  between  CONRAD  and an arguably 
resourcist response  to the story of Andrea  and Bob is only approximate. 
Indeed, there is so much slack here that a resourcist who accepts CONRAD 
as a way of dealing  with such examples  will have adopted  an axiom  the 
most  natural rationale  for which is a broad welfarist principle  which he 
would  hardly accept on  its own. 
PREFERENCES AS RESOURCES? 
Let me  turn now  from  the rationale  for CONRAD  to the  philosophical 
implications  of adopting  it. The  effect  of CONRAD,  Roemer  says, is to 
render  "the  distinction  between  preferences  and  resources  extremely 
hazy" (p. 107). This  remark is followed  by a discussion  of "Fundamental 
Preferences,"  and  Roemer  later observes  that "the domain  assumption 
allows  us to represent  aspects  of  a person's  preferences  as if they  were 114  Ethics  October  1986 
resources, and the CONRAD axiom enforces a certain consistency between 
the  allocation  mechanism's  treatment  of  these  two representations  of a 
given  world.  The  domain  assumption  forces  upon  us  a  reductionist, 
determinist  program" (p.  109). 
I take it that what Roemer has in mind here is that when two economic 
environments  e  =  {m +  n;  x, y, u, v} and  1*  =  {m; -x;  u*, v*} are related 
in  the  way described  in  the  antecedent  of  CONRAD,  the  preferences 
underlying  u* and v* are "represented asif  they were resources" because 
these  preferences  are  seen  as resulting  from  a particular allocation  of 
the resources represented by y-.  It is by including, for any (*, an environment 
e  related  to it in  this way that the  domain  assumption  "forces on  us a 
reductionist,  determinist  program." 
But  this  involves  reading  into  these  axioms  a meaning  that is not 
really there.  To  begin  with,  the  conditions  laid down  in  CONRAD  do 
not insure that (* and e are two representations  of a single "given world." 
Moreover,  in the absence  of "names," these  conditions  tell us very little 
about the resources  involved.  Since x-  is only an m-tuple of real numbers 
until  (*  and  e  are identified  with more  fully described  societies  there  is 
no  answer  to  the  question  whether  the  resources  represented  by k- in 
these  two environments  are the  same  or different.  All that is required 
by the  abstract characterization  of  (*  and  e  is that these  goods  give rise 
to utility in the  same way. 
Suppose, however, that we take (* and e to represent (possibly identical) 
societies  s* and  s in which  the  resources  measured  by K are the  same. 
Call these  "x goods"  and  the  additional  resources  in s "y goods."  Even 
given  this assumption,  the  descriptions  of  (* and  e  taken together  with 
Roemer's  axioms  commit  us  to  no  claim  whatever  about  the  relation 
between  y goods  and individual  preferences  over x goods  (or about the 
presence  of y goods  as hidden  resources  in s*). For all that is said by DI 
and CONRAD,  this relation  might  be any of the following. 
1.  It  might  be  no  relation  at all.  People  in  s may  have  the  same 
preferences  for x goods  that people  in  s* do,  but it may be  that these 
preferences  would  be the same whatever  level  of y goods  the  people  in 
s were consuming.  (Perhaps y goods have significance only within certain 
social  practices  which  add  "an extra dimension"  to life  in s but do  not 
interact with other  consumption  patterns.) 
2. It might be a relation like that between my preferences  for certain 
kinds of crackers and the availability of certain kinds of cheese.  If people 
in s enjoy  consuming  certain x goods  only in conjunction  with certain y 
goods,  then  their  preferences  for x goods  will depend  on  the  amounts 
of y goods  they  are consuming.  In particular, these  preferences  will be 
like  those  of  people  in  s* only  when  y  goods  are  being  consumed  in 
certain quantities. 
3. Finally, it might  be like the relation assumed  to hold in the story 
of Andrea and Bob between the utility derived from corn and the presence 
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Only the last of these possibilities involves anything like "a reductionist, 
determinist  program."  This  last interpretation  of  the  relation  between 
I* and  e  is consistent  with the axioms  D1-D6  but is not forced  upon  us 
by them since they are equally compatible with the other two interpretations 
I have described. 
What "forces upon us a reductionist, determinist program," if anything 
does,  is the  story  Roemer  tells  to  motivate  the  CONRAD  axiom.  The 
situation here appears to me to be this. Roemer wants to push a resource 
egalitarian  toward  equalizing  welfare.  To  do  so,  he  considers  a case in 
which  the  preferences  of  a person  with  less  than  equal  utility  are  the 
result  of  a  particular  allocation  of  "hidden"  resources.  (The  resource 
egalitarian might be indifferent to Bob's utility level per se, but is supposed 
to  pay attention  when  it is seen  that  this  results  from  an  allocation  of 
"hidden" resources.)  Having  used  the  story of Andrea  and  Bob  to give 
a resource  egalitarian  reason  to  adopt  CONRAD,  Roemer  then  reads 
the circumstances  of this example  into the interpretation  of that axiom. 
But  this- is  illicit.  As  I  have  argued  in  the  previous  section,  the  most 
natural  interpretation  of  CONRAD  (and  of  the  other  axioms)  is  a 
straightforwardly welfarist one. This interpretation is quite understandably 
not  of  interest  to  Roemer.  Given  the  purposes  of  his  argument,  the 
question which interests him is whether there exists a compelling resourcist 
rationale  for the axioms  he  needs.  But the natural welfarist rationale  is 
there  nonetheless.  It follows,  therefore,  that these  axioms do not "force 
upon  us a reductionist,  determinist  program" unless  welfarism does  so. 
Perhaps  it does,  but  given  the  range  of  possible  readings  of  Roemer's 
axioms  I do not believe  that they help  to show  that this is the case. 
WHICH  RESOURCES? 
Which goods and conditions should be counted as resources in a resource- 
egalitarian conception  of justice?  The  pressure toward "determinism" in 
Roemer's  paper arises from the answer to this question  which is implicit 
in  his  discussion  of  the  example  of  Andrea  and  Bob:  anything  which 
affects  individual  utility  levels  should  be  counted  as  a  resource  (and 
conditions  which  do  this by altering  preferences  are no  different  from 
goods  which  do it by satisfying  them). 
This  is an answer which  a resourcist  might  well wish to reject, but 
some alternative must be provided.  It would be arbitrary simply to begin 
an account  of justice  with some  list of  resources  taken as given  and  in 
need of no defense.  A reasonable desire to avoid this kind of arbitrariness, 
I believe,  is what lies behind  Roemer's  wariness about  "names" and  his 
concern  that a theory employing  them would "impose" values on people 
who need not share them. No list of resources can be taken as fundamental; 
any list must  be defended  with reference  to the  needs  and interests  of 
the people  to whom the theory is meant to apply. If we take this to mean 
that it must be defended  with reference  to their preferences,  then it seems 
to follow that any theory of justice  must, at base, be welfarist. If we add 116  Ethics  October  1986 
the observation that welfare-that  is, utility-can  be increased by resources 
which  modify  preferences  as well as by those  which  satisfy them,  then 
we seem to have opened  the door to "treating preferences  like resources" 
and  hence,  at  least  potentially,  to  what  Roemer  called  "a determinist 
program." But these  conclusions  would  be premature. 
The  question  at issue  is the  selection  of  a standard  for measuring 
distributive  shares,  where  this  standard  is  to  be  used  by  people  with 
differing  and  malleable  tastes  and  preferences.  This  fact  of  differing 
preference  is part of  our  reason  for being  concerned  about  the  threat 
of  "arbitrary" or  "imposed"  standards.  One  response  to  this  fact  is to 
look for some  common  ground  behind  our disagreement:  we may have 
different  preferences,  but we are all concerned  to have these preferences 
satisfied to the greatest possible degree-that  is, concerned  with our own 
utility. A second  approach  is to look  for common  elements  in what we 
prefer:  we share general  interests  in having  food,  shelter,  opportunities 
for education,  and so on.  A list of resources  is a fair standard according 
to  this  approach  if  it adequately  measures  people's  ability to  advance 
these  general  categories  of  shared  interests. 
Resources which advance these interests may thereby "increase utility." 
But  a resourcist  conception  of justice  need  not  regard  the  importance 
of these  interests  as subsumed  within that of a larger whole,  utility. The 
reasons  against  doing  so are particularly clear in the  case of  resources 
such as education,  which contribute  to preference  change.  People  want 
to have preferences  be ones which stand up in the light of reflection and 
the available facts. But they do not view preferences  as things which they 
have  reason  to change  whenever  this would  yield  greater  utility. A jus- 
tification of preference-changing resources which appeals to shared general 
interests  is thus more  consistent  with the view people  take of their own 
preferences  than a welfarist justification  would  be. 
Consider  another  example.  Assume  we live in a society  marked by 
sharp differences  in religious  belief.  Aware of these  differences,  we can 
also recognize  "the opportunity  to pursue one's religious  convictions" as 
a shared  general  interest  in the  sense just  discussed.  Appealing  to this 
interest,  one  can  then  argue  for  the  importance  of  certain  resources: 
protection  against discrimination,  opportunities  for religious observance, 
freedom  to read,  and  disseminate  literature  on  religious  topics,  and  so 
on.  If  these  resources  are fairly distributed,  however,  that is all that a 
resourcist  view  of justice  requires  as far as religion  is concerned.  The 
choice  of religion  (or no religion)  is entirely  up to each  person,  and the 
amount  of  utility resulting  from  this choice  is specifically  not  an object 
of  public  policy. 
Consider  an alternative.  What religion  a particular person  belongs 
to  is a contingent  matter:  I might  have  grown  up  in  circumstances  in 
which  it would  never  have  occurred  to  me  to  be  a Catholic  (or never 
occurred  to me  not  to be one).  Such  differences  in religious  belief  are 
one thing that can produce  differences  in utility level, and someone  who Scanlon  Equality of Resources  and Welfarism  117 
regarded equality of welfare as the standard of interpersonal justification 
would have to regard these differences as being grounds for compensation: 
compensation for having acquired a particularly onerous or guilt-inducing 
religion or one particularly unsuited  to one's own personal strengths and 
weaknesses.  This  strikes me as distinctly odd.  Quite  apart from  the fact 
that it might destroy the point of religious burdens to have them lightened 
by social compensation,  the idea that these burdens are grounds  for such 
compensation  (a form of bad luck) is incompatible  with regarding  them 
as  matters  of  belief  and  conviction  which  one  values  and  adheres  to 
because  one  thinks them  right. 
I have  suggested  that argument  about justice  employs  "names" of 
specific resources  and that these  are justified  with reference  to "names" 
of shared general interests.  I have argued that the use of such a standard 
of distributive  shares is not arbitrary and that it is more compatible  with 
the view people  take of their own preferences  and interests than a notion 
of utility would  be. A list of "shared general  interests" is, of course,  not 
simply given;  it is something  whose  fairness in a particular situation  has 
to be argued for. This argument,  in turn, does not reach "beyond names," 
but involves  mentioning  specific further  interests  and arguing  that they 
are insufficiently  recognized  by the currently accepted  way of measuring 
bundles  of  resources.  In  this  respect,  argument  about justice  involves 
names  "all the way down." 
Another  way of putting  the point would be to say that "preference" 
is itself a "name," and not a particularly potent  one.  Simply to say "But 
I  would  strongly  prefer  ..."  is  not  yet  a  very  strong  argument  for 
revising the list of resources.  It is only when the interest at stake is given 
a more  informative  "name" that we can see  what would  be involved  in 
recognizing  it as having  special force  as a claim of justice. 
IDEAL THEORY? 
At  the  end  of  his  paper,  Roemer  remarks,  "My concern  here  has  not 
been  with institutions  which will implement  the just  allocation,  in which 
case incentive  problems  would  have  to be  considered,  but  simply  with 
what allocation  is desirable.  This  is first-best normative  analysis. Before 
one begins  to compromise,  it would be nice to know what the goal would 
be, if everyone  knew everything"  (p.  110). 
I believe,  on the contrary, that the terms in which it is appropriate 
to argue about justice  inevitably reflect "nonideal" features of our world, 
such as our lack of full knowledge  and the kinds of agreement,  disagree- 
ment,  and conflict which are common  among  us. In particular, it seems 
to  me  that  institutions  are  not  a  matter  of  "compromise"  but  have  a 
fundamental  place  in determining  which  outcomes  are just.  There  are 
many reasons  for holding  institutions  to be prior in this way. Here  I will 
mention  only  one,  a reason  which  is strengthened  by the  conclusions 
which  Roemer  reaches  elsewhere  in his paper. 118  Ethics  October  1986 
If one  believes,  as Roemer  suggests,  that a person's preferences  are 
largely  shaped  by  outside  factors,  presumably  in  particular  by  social 
institutions, then the choice of such institutions takes on special importance. 
What one  wants is to have  institutions  which  provide  a favorable  envi- 
ronment  in which  to develop  preferences  and  make  choices  in  pursuit 
of the goals one has adopted: a favorable environment in which to develop 
and  live as a "self-steering  mechanism"  among  other  such  individuals. 
We  do  not  have  a complete  view of  what  counts  as a "favorable envi- 
ronment"  of  this kind, but we do have a partial account  given  by a list 
of the kinds of "resources" it is important to have and the kind of dangers 
it is important  to avoid.  As I have  indicated  above,  moral and  political 
argument  is a continuing  process  of  debate  about  these  lists.  Beyond 
this, there is no characterization  of "the ideal"  from which political argument 
could  begin.  What each of us, personally,  regards as the ideal depends 
on  how  we develop  within  the  institutions  in which  we are placed  and 
is therefore,  at any given time, incompletely  determined.  This openness 
of possibilities-the  idea that what we do and what we value remains  to 
be determined  by how we react to and reflect upon  our environment- 
is the freedom  which remains  to us even as "determined" beings.  Moral 
argument,  then,  even among  such beings,  cannot begin  from an answer 
to the question  of what would be ideal for us individually and collectively 
and proceed  from there to ask what institutions  would realize that ideal. 
All we  can ask of  one  another  is a favorable  environment  in which  to 
work out and pursue  our own differing  and as yet incompletely  defined 
conceptions  of  "the ideal." 